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Deflation counts among the worst things that could happen to an economy, the conventional wisdom tells us. But 
are falling prices really that bad? According to the Austrian School of Economics, this is not necessarily the 
case. A distinction is commonly made between (1) growth, (2) cash-building, (3) bank credit and (4) 
confiscatory deflation. When it comes to the first three kinds, falling prices are regarded as benign free market 
responses to changing circumstance, whether these are positive or negative by themselves. When it comes to the 
latter, it is often regarded as something negative.  
Lately, the word deflation has become almost synonymous with Japan and its economic problems. In this 
paper, the development of the Japanese economy of 1990-2001 is revisited. While consumer prices fell in 1995 
and 1999-2001, if other prices are taken into account, it appears that the overall price level actually fell during 
most of the years throughout the period, 1997 and 2000 being exceptions. When it comes to the causes of the 
deflation, any confiscatory deflation created by the government is ruled out, since the money supply has been 
rising throughout the period. Instead, it is suggested that the deflation of 1994, 1995 and 1996 was exclusively 
caused by rising supply, i.e. there was growth deflation. This could also have been the case in 1991 and 1992, 
but the evidence is somewhat inconclusive. Moreover, deflation in 1993, 1998 and 2001 appears exclusively to 
have been caused by falling aggregate demand, suggesting cash-building or bank credit deflation. Finally, 
deflation in 1999 might have been caused by a combination of growth, cash-building and bank credit deflation. 
In all of these cases, the falling prices are to be regarded as benign.  
Although based on the same set of data, these findings diverge sharply from the official Japanese view of the 
economy at the time. This is ascertained by studying the official records of the time the consumer price index 
moved into the negative domain for the first time recorded. Instead of seeing this as something possibly benign, 
the conventional fear of deflation on the part of the Bank of Japan came to dominate its actions. And if it is true 
that falling prices are a benign response to the changes that actually occurred in Japan at the time, then any 
measures taken to make prices not fall cannot be of the benign nature. And if there were one thing most 
economists would agree on it would probably be that Japan’s economic malaise is not over. This seems to be an 
important lesson for the future – preventing a free market adjusting, including deflation, to changing 
circumstances could possibly prevent or prolong a recovery. 
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1 Introduction 
Deflation counts among the worst things that could happen to an economy, the conventional 
wisdom tells us. Lately, the word deflation has become almost synonymous with Japan and its 
economic problems. But are falling prices really that bad? According to the Austrian School 
of Economics, this is not necessarily the case. In fact, falling prices are in most cases regarded 
as benign.  
With this view, the development of the Japanese economy of 1990-2001 is revisited. 
Among other things, it is found that the deflation at times was a consequence of rising 
aggregate supply while at other times of a combination of cash-building deflation and bank-
credit deflation, all of which are regarded to be basically benign free market responses to 
changing circumstance (whether good or bad).  
Although based on the same set of data, these findings diverge sharply from the official 
Japanese view of the economy at the time. This is ascertained by studying the official records 
of the time the fear of deflation first emerged. 
This paper proceeds by in more detail explaining the view on deflation and aggregate price 
determination relied upon. Then some facts about the development in Japan 1990-2001 are 
provided, together with an extensive interpretation of these. This is followed by a closer 
examination of the official Japanese interpretation, contrasting it with my own views. Finally 
some concluding remarks are made. 
2 Some Theoretical Remarks 
Adherents of the Austrian School of economics usually define deflation and inflation in terms 
of changes in the overall money supply, while the mainstream definition refers to changes in 
average prices. To avoid confusion, I will stick to the mainstream definition, thus defining 
deflation as falling average prices. 
An attempt to present an Austrian state of the art on deflation was recently made by 
Salerno (2003). He classifies the causes of falling prices as follows: (i) growth deflation, (ii) 
cash-building deflation, (iii) bank credit deflation and (iv) confiscatory deflation. The first 
two operate on the demand side of the “money relation”, while the latter on the supply side. 
Salerno concludes that the first three causes, in a free market of voluntary cooperation, are 
benign responses to changing circumstances, while the latter kind of coercive intervention in   4 
the free market is basically bad. Note that this allows for the possibility that the changing 
circumstances themselves could be either good or bad.
1 
Changes in the money supply tend to affect prices basically since it brings about changes 
the overall volume of spending. More money - more spending - higher prices, or conversely, 
less money – less spending – lower prices, would be a simple characterization of this view. 
This could be represented by the formula: 
P = D / S           (1) 
where P is the average price level, D the aggregate demand in nominal terms and S the supply 
of goods and services expressed in physical terms, all during a given period
2. Formula (1) tells 
us that the prices could fall in connection to (a) a rise in physical production and supply of 
goods and services and (b) a fall in aggregate demand. The case of (a) would correspond to 
growth deflation, while (b) would be caused by either cash-building, bank credit contraction 
or government confiscatory deflation.
3 
Thus, according to the view adopted in this paper, deflation is not to fear from an economy-
wide perspective, unless forcibly imposed on the free market by means of government 
intervention. With this in mind we can revisit the Japanese experience.  
3 Analyzing the Japanese Deflation 
To see how the Japanese economy developed during the 1990-2001 period, we could start by 
focusing on aggregate demand and prices. When it comes to aggregate demand, this paper 
will rely on the Gross Domestic Revenue (GDR) gross measure of nominal spending, as 
outlined by Reisman (1996). This measure differs from the widely used Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) measure in that it includes not only (i) gross investment expenditure on fixed 
assets, but also (ii) gross investment on inventories and work-in-progress, as well as the (iii) 
current business expenditure that is charged off in the year it is incurred (as opposed to being 
amortized over a period of years)
4. These three items are together referred to as productive 
expenditure. By taking the full productive expenditure into account (and not only one 
                                                 
1 See Salerno (2003) for more on this. See also Rothbard (1962, pp. 672-75) and The Quarterly Journal of Austrian 
Economics’ winter 2003 special edition on deflation. See also Reisman (2003) for slightly differing view, a view that will 
find some support in the evidence presented below.  
2 The formula was used already by the classical economists, see for example J. S. Mill (1848, Book III, Chapter II, §3). 
3 Although the main determinant of aggregate demand would be the money supply, it is fully conceivable that in the short 
run, these magnitudes might move in opposite directions. It is of course also perfectly conceivable that changes in aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply could have a mutually offsetting influence on prices, as well as one of the two could be 
dominating in any particular instance. For example, it is conceivable that if for some reasons the aggregate demand would 
decrease by 6, 8 or 10%, and at the same time the aggregate supply decreases by 2%, the price level will fall by 4.1, 6.1 and 
8.2%. We will see examples of both of these kinds of changes below. 
4 This means that to the [gross investment in fixed assets = net investment + depreciation of fixed assets] and that gross 
investment in inventories and work-in-progress = net investment + cost of goods sold].   5 
component of it as in GDP), some interesting facts fully in line with Austrian thought are 
revealed
5.  
Table 1 shows the changes in GDR as well as the Money Supply (MS - measured as M1), 
the Consumer Price Index (CPI) and the Producer Price Index (PPI)
6.  
Table 1 – Changes in GDR, MS, CPI and PPI, 1991-2001, % 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999  2000  2001 
GDR  5,7% 1,4% -1,0% 0,8% 2,1% 2,8% 2,8% -2,2%  -1,9%  1,6%  -0,9% 
MS (M1)  8,8% 1,9% 3,4% 4,9%  12,8%  10,0%  8,9% 6,1%  11,8%  4,1%  13,6% 
CPI*  3.3% 1.7% 1.3% 0.6% -0.1% 0.1% 1.8% 0.6%  -0.3%  -0.7%  -0.7% 
PPI**  -2.1% -1.4% -3.3% -1.0% -0.3% -0.1% 1.6% -4.4% -1.5%  1.1%  -0.9% 
Sources: Economic and Social Research Institute and own calculations (GDR), Statistics Bureau, and Statistics Center, Ministry of Public 
Management, Home Affairs, Posts and Telecommunications, Government of Japan (CPI) and Bank of Japan (MS and PPI).  
Notes: *Yearly average, y/y figures **End of year y/y figures.  
From the GDR data we can single out 1993, 1998, 1999 and 2001 as years when the aggregate 
demand fell, i.e. these were years of deflationary pressure. The rest of the years should then 
be years of inflationary pressure.  
From the money supply data, it appears the Bank of Japan (BoJ) did its very best to make 
sure that the money supply was inflated during the period. Evidence of this is the aggressively 
loose monetary policy conducted including consecutive rate cuts down to record low levels, 
as shown in figure 1.  




















Source: Bank of Japan 
                                                 
5 See Appendix for more about GDR and its relation to GDP. The GDR measure is approximately 2.5 times as larger than 
GDP. During the period at hand, GDR was more volatile than GDP. The changes were of the same sign and more or less of 
the same order, except in 1993 when GDP increased by 0.7 % while GDR fell by 1.0 %. 
6 PPI as represented by the Overall Wholesale Price Index (OWPI). The OWPI is the weighted average of the Domestic 
Wholesale Price Index (DWPI), the Export Price Index (EPI), and the Import Price Index (IPI). The OWPI  focuses on the 
prices of goods traded among corporations.   6 
This means that we actually could exclude the fourth cause of deflation discussed above, 
namely the confiscatory deflation where there is a contraction in the money supply brought 
about by government intervention. Thus, we only have to consider the other three benign 
causes of deflation.  
When it comes to prices, we see that consumer prices fell in 1995, 1999, 2000 and 2001, 
and rose in all the other years. Producer prices fell every year during the period except in 
1997 and 2000 when they rose. As productive expenditure accounts for roughly ¾ of the 
overall GDR expenditure (see Appendix), we can make the rough conclusion that overall 
prices seem to have fallen in 1991, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2001, i.e. 
all years but 1997 and 2000. On top of that, prices of real estate have fallen every year during 
the period and the average price of a share at the Nikkei stock market has fallen by over 70 
percent (while, interestingly, the trading volume has risen by over 80 percent). 
Thus, the signs shown in Table 2 are implied. 
Table 2 – Sign of Changes in money supply, prices and aggregate demand, 1991-2001 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Money  Supply  + + + + + + + + + + + 
Aggregate  Demand  + + – + + + + – – + – 
Prices  – – – – – – + – – + – 
From this we could make the following preliminary conclusions. Deflation apparently was 
exclusively caused by rising aggregate supply in 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995, 1996, i.e. there was 
growth deflation, since aggregate demand was rising in these years. Deflation in 1993, 1998, 
1999, 2001 could have been caused by any of the three causes under consideration, i.e. 
growth, cash-building or bank credit deflation.  
When it comes to the latter preliminary conclusion, it should be noted that we already have 
ruled out confiscatory deflation as a cause of the deflation. This would suggest that the 
combinations of deflation and falling aggregate demand displayed in table 2 would have been 
caused either by cash-building deflation or by bank credit deflation, likely both. It is clear that 
one major ingredient of the Japanese problems has been the banks so it seems likely that there 
have been at least some bank credit deflation. At the same time, we can’t exclude the 
possibility of rising supply as part of the deflation.  
There is some support for the preliminary conclusion that rising aggregate supply has 
caused deflation. For example, the Industrial Production Index (IPI) rose in 1994, 1995, 1996, 
1999 and 2000, as shown in figure 2 (leaving the other figures on the side for a moment). This 
would suggest that at least in 1999, rising supply could have been among the causes of the   7 
deflation. On the other hand, the fact that IPI didn’t rise in 1991 and 1992 would contradict 
the first preliminary conclusion. Anyhow, we obtain these conclusions: 
1.  Deflation in 1994, 1995 and 1996 was exclusively caused by rising supply, i.e. there was growth 
deflation
7. This could also have been the case in 1991 and 1992, but the evidence is somewhat 
contradictive.  
2.  Deflation in 1993, 1998 and 2001 was exclusively caused by falling aggregate demand, 
suggesting cash-building or bank credit deflation.  
3.  Deflation in 1999 might have been caused by a combination of growth, cash-building and bank 
credit deflation. 















Industrial production -2,5% -7,9% -4,0% 5,7% 1,9% 3,1% -0,9% -6,6% 5,1% 4,8% -14,8%
TANKAN, actual sales 1,0% -3,6% -4,7% -0,2% 1,4% 4,5% -1,6% -7,7% -2,1% 2,8% -3,9%
Volume of operating profits 4,4% -9,0% -2,5% -6,2% 0,3% 8,1% 0,9% -10,4% 0,3% 3,4% -6,1%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
 
Sources: Economic and Social Research Institute; Bank of Japan; Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and own calculations 
When it comes to deflation related to a falling aggregate demand, there is a debate whether 
the falling demand could cause some serious economy-wide problems, and here we could 
provide some empirical evidence on this topic. On the one hand, Reisman (2003) argues that 
the contraction of the money supply and aggregate spending could cause, in all but the growth 
deflation case, sales revenue and profits to fall and this in turn creating debt repayment 
problems (however, the solution to such problems would still be falling prices). On the other 
hand, Bagus (2003, p.32) argues that there is no inherent reason why costs couldn’t fall faster 
than prices, thus suggesting Reisman’s argument is invalid. However, Bagus base his point on 
the idea that costs are equal to wage payments, which is far from true. Basic knowledge about 
income statements and balance sheets tells us that even in the case that a business would cut 
their wages down to zero, and even if all kind of spending would come to a halt, there would 
still be costs for the business in the form of depreciation against fixed assets and cost of goods 
                                                 
7 The perhaps most notable case of falling prices due to increasing production and supply would today be Mainland China. 
See for example Fed (2002b) and Lo (2003).    8 
sold (if inventories are cleared). Thus, there is an inherent lag between on the one hand prices 
and sales revenue and on the other hand costs. It thus seems that there is some theoretical 
justification for Reisman’s view. What about the empirical evidence? 
From figure 2 we see that sales and profits actually fell in the deflationary years of 1993, 
1998 and 2001, when falling aggregate demand was the main cause of the deflation. Since 
1994 was a year of growth deflation, the falling prices of 1993 actually appear to have been 
sufficient to overcome the problems. The same might hold for 1999 when IPI rose 5.1 
percent, but evidence is not conclusive. 2002 falls outside of this study. Thus, while the data 
provide some empirical support for Reisman’s view on the problems related to falling 
aggregate demand, it is interesting to note that there is nothing in the data that contradicts the 
idea that falling prices mitigate the problems with falling aggregate demand, sales, 
profitability and debt repayment. 
Some further comments 
Before turning to the official Japanese interpretation of the development during the period, it 
is possible to make at least three further interesting remarks. First of all, there is data that 
reveal something else of great importance – it proves that Japan has not been in a 
Keynesian/Hicksian ‘liquidity trap’. The MEC and IS curve in the IS-LM analysis, i.e. the 
foundations of the idea of the liquidity trap, tells us that the relation between the rate of profit 
and net investment is negative. That is, when the rate of profit falls, net investment would 
rise, and vice versa. But by plotting the net investment against the rate of profit, both in terms 
of actual, forecasted as well as in the form of the change in the volume of profits, we see that 
it has been a far from clear negative relationship. In fact, it is tempting to rather draw the 
opposite conclusion, as the variables have moved closely together in Japan during the 1991-
2001 period. Hence, the idea of the liquidity trap in Japan seems to be refuted.
8  
                                                 
8 This helps explain why for example Krugman (1998b) has such problem of applying the liquidity trap on Japan. For 
example, he changes investment on the horizontal axis to consumption, i.e. the exact opposite. For more on the flawed idea 
underlying the liquidity trap myth, see Johnsson (2003).   9 
Figure 3 – Changes in Net Investment, changes in the volume of operating profits and the rate of 
















Net investment, % 4,8% -13,7% -13,7% -14,0% -3,2% 11,0% -3,9% -24,7% -13,8% -4,7% -22,2%
Rate of profit, actual, % -14,4% -24,6% -19,8% 12,5% 19,1% 12,0% -7,3% -16,1% 24,2% 18,0% -19,6%
Rate of profit, forecast, % -10,7% -23,7% -22,4% 11,9% 14,5% 8,1% -6,7% -23,1% 14,3% 11,0% -25,9%
Volume of operating profits 4,4% -9,0% -2,5% -6,2% 0,3% 8,1% 0,9% -10,4% 0,3% 3,4% -6,1%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
 
Sources: Economic and Social Research Institute (net investment and volume of operating profits) and the Tankan—Short-term Economic 
Survey of Enterprises in Japan of the Bank of Japan (rate of profit) 
Secondly, there is a further remark that seems to give credibility to the GDR measure, the use 
of formula (1) and hence my interpretation thus far. The changes in CPI and PPI could be 
interpreted by studying the parts of GDR expenditure made for the purpose of consumption 
and production, respectively. This follows since formula (1) could be applied to any part of 
the bulk of expenditure as well. Thus, we could compare the changes in the two different 
kinds of expenditure to the respective price changes (CPI and PPI). The upper part of Figure 4 
shows the changes in consumption expenditure (C+G) and CPI while the lower shows the 
changes in productive expenditure plus net exports (B+NX) and PPI. Suddenly the changes in 
CPI and PPI appear to make some sense. They follow closely the changes in the respective 
kind of expenditure.    10 
Figure 4 – Upper part: changes in private and public consumption expenditure (C+G) vs. Consumer 
price index (CPI), and Lower part: changes in productive expenditure and net exports expenditure 




































Sources: Economic and Social Research Institute, Bank of Japan and own calculations 
Thirdly, according to the Austrian School of Economics, one would have to study not only 
expenditure on and prices of the consumer’s goods, but also on the expenditure on and prices 
of capital goods, to get a full understanding of the dynamics of an economy
9. If for some 
reason people voluntarily choose to invest more funds in production, rather than consuming 
them, we might expect capital accumulation and that more will be produced in the future. In 
the same way as expenditure made for the purpose of consumption tends to make an 
individual poorer, ceteris paribus, and expenditure for productive purposes tends to make an 
individual richer, ceteris paribus, this also holds at an economy-wide level. While more 
overall expenditure on consumer’s goods, at the expense of investment, certainly enriches the 
sellers of these goods, if it is continued, the capacity to produce capital goods is diminished. 
And since the consumer’s goods are produced with the aid of such capital goods, also the 
production of consumer’s goods will be diminished. Hence, consumption will after some time 
                                                 
9 This is often referred to as the structure of production. See for example von Strigl (1934, p.27), Rothbard (1962, Ch.5) or 
Garrison (2001, Ch.3). See also Reisman (1996, p.820-4 and 852-4).   11 
have to fall. In line with this kind of reasoning, there is a clear distinction between consumer’s 
goods and capital goods, on consumption and production or investment.
10 
One way to illustrate this is to relate the productive expenditure to the expenditure made on 
consumption. Defining the Relative Expenditure Ratio (RER) as the ratio between the 
[B+NX] expenditure and the [C+G] expenditure, the change in RER is given by figure 5. 
Interestingly, the changes in RER coincide with the changes in the overall level of GDR 
expenditure, also shown in figure 5
11. Moreover, the overall shifts in the structure of the 
(relative) expenditure also coincide with the major changes in industrial production, sales and 
profits shown in figure 2. Taken together, this seems to show the importance of studying the 
structure production.  



























Relative Expenditure Ratio -0,2% -4,0% -5,0% -3,2% -0,1% 0,2% 1,1% -3,4% -2,9% 1,3% -2,2%
GDR 5,7% 1,4% -1,0% 0,8% 2,1% 2,8% 2,8% -2,2% -1,9% 1,6% -0,9%
GDP 7,0% 2,6% 0,7% 0,8% 1,1% 2,7% 2,0% -1,2% -1,3% 0,5% -1,4%
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
 
Sources: Economic and Social Research Institute and own calculations 
That concludes my interpretation of the events from what basically is an Austrian perspective. 
Regardless of the underlying reasons, the fact that prices did fall during the 1990-2001 period 
seems to have been something good per se. And this brings me to the official Japanese 
interpretation of the event.  
                                                 
10 There is also an important distinction between different stages of production. The analysis of the Austrian Business Cycle 
Theory (ABCT) also is highly relevant for the causes of the occurrence of the economic problems in Japan in the first place. 
Following von Mises (1912), the ABCT shows how officially and newly created money and credit inflation without real 
backing creates a boom, a boom that necessarily must end in a bust as the money is wiped out. See von Mises (1936) for a 
short version. I would also like to mention analysis of Japan put forward by Bonner (2003), particularly the demographics. 
11 There is no circular reasoning here, since there is nothing that analytically says that the relation between the parts of the 
whole has to have anything to do with the change in size of the whole itself. I’ve included figures on GDP just to show how 
the changes in RER seem to predict changes in GDP as well. Since RER is based on GDR, this could be seen as yet another 
argument in favor of the use of GDR over GDP.   12 
4 Official Japanese Interpretation 
The great concern about falling prices and deflation did not start until 1995. The fall in CPI by 
0.1 percent of this year was the first recorded decline since the current statistical survey began 
in 1970
12. It might prove useful to contrast the official view on this topic with my own 
findings. This could be made by simply studying the monetary and fiscal policy measures 
taken by BoJ and other official agents during the 1990-2001 period in response to what they 
perceived was going on in the country. Before doing that, it is important to note that there are 
some mainstream economists that claim that prices could fall because of increased 
productivity, i.e. due to positive “productivity shocks” and consequent “output gaps”. Thus, 
one would at least expect to find some discussions on this possible cause of the falling prices 
of 1995 in the official records.
13  
To gain a deeper understanding of what kind of reasoning they did base their actions on 
(like in figure 1 above), the BoJ Quarterly Economic Outlook for 1995 could be a useful 
source. In the February edition, we can read that “prices will be stable”, the decline in year-to-
year domestic wholesale prices “will become smaller” and that “the rate of increase in 
consumer prices may virtually stop dwindling” (see Table 1 above). The outlook ends by 
noting that “in sum, Japan’s economy will probably continue to recover.” Hence, in February, 
BoJ seemed rather positive and this view comes from, among other things, the fact that they 
believed producer prices would stop falling and consumer prices to stop increasing at such a 
slow rate. 
In the May edition, we can read that it appears “domestic wholesale prices have now 
stopped declining but are likely to go down again. The year-to-year increase in consumer 
prices will stay about zero as the increase in cheap imports will exert downward pressures on 
consumer prices, the so-called ‘price destruction’ phenomenon.” They continue by stating 
that, “in sum, […] moderate economic recovery has been under way in Japan […]. In these 
circumstances, the Bank of Japan […] lowered the official discount rate by 0.75 percent point 
to 1 percent, on April 14 […].” Hence, in May, BoJ seems to have believed that falling prices 
were so destructive as to prompt them to cut interest rates.  
In the August edition, they start by noting that “economic recovery has paused in Japan 
despite expansionary forces that underlie the economy.” Furthermore, “prices are expected to 
continue a weak trend owing to the weak economic recovery” and “the declining trend of 
                                                 
12 See BoJ (2000). 
13 However, this view should not be mixed with the growth deflation (increasing aggregate supply) discussed above since 
increased productivity need not materialize into new goods and services. Historically, some of this increasing productivity 
has made it possible to afford more spare time.   13 
domestic wholesale prices is expected to persist while consumer prices are also forecast to 
decrease somewhat year to year […].” And in conclusion, “in these circumstances, the Bank 
of Japan, considering the influence that an excessive decline in prices may have on the 
economy,” they soon again lowered the discount rate down to 0.5 percent in September. “The 
effects of these monetary policy actions, combined with the easing in March and April 1995, 
are expected to contribute to the sustainability of economic recovery by stimulating demand 
[…],” the report ends. Thus, in August, they expressed the idea that price increases means a 
strong economy, and vice versa, and that the prospect of deflation needed to be combated by 
further rate cuts.  
In the November edition, BoJ starts by noting that “the pause in Japan’s economic recovery 
continues.” They continue by noting that, “in addition, the ‘Economic Measures Toward 
Steady Economic Recovery’, announced on September 20, 1995 will add a substantial amount 
of public-sector investment and is expected to contribute significantly to the upturn of the 
economy in early 1996. Housing investment is also expected to recover in the fourth quarter 
of 1995 against the background of low interest rates.” They also declared that “prices are 
expected to remain unchanged or decline marginally.” In November, we once again see that 
they believed that prices weren’t rising because the economy had paused, and was in 
desperate need of some Keynesian stimulation. 
Hence, from the 1995 Quarterly Economic Outlook we could conclude that the BoJ clearly 
expressed a fear of falling prices. Moreover, we could conclude that they had a true belief that 
typical Keynesian measures like increasing public consumptive expenditure (although it 
might be called investment), lowering interest rates and creating more money to increase 
private housing consumption (although they might call also this investment) would be enough 
to turn the economy around
14. They clearly relied on the GDP measure, and its focus on 
consumption expenditure, as an indicator of whether the economy was doing well or not. 
Finally, BoJ did not take falling prices and a stable or increasing nominal GDP, i.e. a rising 
real GDP, as a good sign – the fear of falling prices seems to have hidden this fact. There was 
no discussion about any possibilities of “productivity shocks”, even though it was a fact that 
BoJ’s own Tankan index was rising, as did industrial production and profits. Thus, it appears 
BoJ even ignored some of the mainstream ideas on productivity-induced fall in prices. They 
simply appear to have believed that rising prices were good, falling prices bad. 
                                                 
14 See for example Herbener (1999) or Powell (2002) for more on the Keynesian and Monetarist interpretation of the 
Japanese economy.   14 
In sum, it appears that it was the possibility of a fall in consumer prices per se that caused 
these concerns, because the size of the fall itself was close to zero (0.1 percent). This has 
deftly been named Apoplithorismosphobia, or deflation-phobia, by Thornton (2003)
15.  
This interpretation of the situation stands in sharp contrast to my interpretation outlined 
above, even granted the fact that BoJ did not have the possibility of hindsight in the way I 
have had.  
5 Concluding Remarks 
What consequences might one expect from the official measures taken, based on the official 
interpretation? Well, if deflation really would be benign for the economy at large (except for 
confiscatory deflation), then we might expect that any measures taken to prevent prices from 
falling might be not so benign. And most of the official measures taken have indeed been 
aiming at keeping the growth in money supply, in aggregate demand and the level of price 
inflation up.  
The result? It appears the official measures have been quite successful in their mistaken 
attempt to improve the economic situation – indeed, more money has been spent and things 
have generally become more expensive. But if there were one thing most economists would 
agree on it would probably be that Japan’s economic malaise is not over. This seems to be an 
important lesson for the future – preventing a free market adjustment to changing 
circumstances, including deflation, could prevent or prolong a recovery. Similar policy 
measures are most likely to fail in the future as well, despite the advice of some famous 
mainstream economists
16. 
As von Mises showed so long ago, government intervention in the economy tend to cause 
unintended problems, problems that later are used as excuses for further interventions. 
However caring and intelligent the individuals within the official bureaucracy, the ideas they 
base their decisions on appears not to measure up to any reasonable standards. Unfortunately, 
until a change of ideas occurs, the economic malaise of Japan is likely to continue.  
                                                 
15 Another example of this would be Fed (2002a). 
16 According to Reuters on April 14, 2003, Nobel laureate and former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz the same 
day said “the Japanese government could stimulate domestic demand by printing money, in a form similar to U.S. treasury 
paper.” That is, above the money printing conducted by BoJ. According to popular economist and NY Times columnist Paul 
Krugman (1998a, 2001 and 2003), the problem is too little spending regardless of what kind, so that the spending in 
connection to the destruction of skyscrapers or even war is good for the economy.   15 
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Appendix 
For those familiar with the system of national accounting, it is known that to obtain the Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) from the Net Domestic Product (NDP), the depreciation of fixed 
assets is added. If NDP is given by: 
profits + wages = NDP = C + I + G + NX       (A1) 
where C is private consumption, I net investments, G public consumption and NX net exports 
(i.e. exports-imports), GDP is given by: 
profits + wages + depr. of fixed assets = GDP = C + I + G + NX + depr. of fixed assets  (A2) 
On the other hand, GDR is obtained by adding business costs in accordance to the income 
statements of the period at hand. This means that, since [profits + business costs = sales 
revenue], that the counterpart of the left hand side of A2 becomes [sales revenue + wages]. 
This seems intuitively very appealing as a measure of gross income during a period, and 
certainly more intuitively appealing than the [profits + wages + depr. of fixed assets] of the 
GDP measure
17. Thus, GDR is given by: 
sales revenue + w = GDR = C + B + G + NX      (A3) 
where B is the productive expenditure, corresponding to (i) gross investment in fixed assets, 
(ii) gross investment in inventories and work-in-progress, and (iii) current productive 
expenditure.
18 
The Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI), Cabinet Office, Government of Japan, 
publishes sufficient data for the computation of GDR. The result is shown in Table A1. 
Table A1 – Japanese NDP, GDP and GDR, 1990-2001, Billion Yen 
  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
NDP  370 277  394 204  400 632  401 101  402 904  405 950  416 112  424 313  416 429  410 211  410 423  401 878 
GDP  439 482  470 160  482 369  485 704  489 580  494 900  508 163  518 547  512 578  505 892  508 264  500 972 
GDR  1 164 581  1 230 394  1 247 172  1 234 720  1 244 832  1 270 744  1 306 617  1 343 115  1 313 366  1 287 845  1 307 874 1 296 380 
    Private consumption  234 280  247 568  258 035  264 156  272 636  276 836  283 382  288 808  288 103  286 583  285 808  286 240 
    Public consumption  58 870  62 603  66 163  69 183  71 389  74 729  77 557  79 165  80 795  82 895  85 997  88 098 
    Productive Expenditure  825 567  873 556  875 687  857 272  856 538  873 950  896 117  919 069  889 417  867 224  880 814  869 475 
    Exports  45 863  46 668  47 288  44 109  44 270  45 230  49 561  56 074  55 051  51 144  55 256  52 567 
 
                                                 
17 Furthermore, it could be argued that in national accounting, either you should use a measure containing only gross terms (a 
gross measure), or a measure containing only net terms (a net measure). There could be no justification whatsoever for the 
use of a measure that contains a mix of net and gross terms (a gross net measure). The fact that the alleged gross measure of 
GDP contains a net term, net investment in inventories, seems to make it a totally flawed gross net measure. This is not the 
same as saying that GDR is the ultimate measure, though. 
18 For more on this, see Reisman (1996), p. 702. 